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THE S&L CRISIS REVISITED: EXPORTING AN
AMERICAN MODEL TO RESOLVE
THAILAND’S BANKING PROBLEMS*
I.  INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, 1997 was a turbulent and devastating year for
Asia.1  Several countries in the region experienced severe economic
dislocation in the midst of weakening currencies, tumbling stock
markets, and plummeting sovereign debt ratings.2  The languishing
economies will inevitably bring scores of bankruptcies in their wake,
and the resulting financial hardship can all too easily translate into
social and political unrest.  The “miracle” economies, for the time
being, have suddenly lost their luster.
The problems plaguing Asia stem to a large extent from struc-
tural defects that have been festering for years.  A major contributing
factor is a frail and inefficient banking system.  Thailand provides an
interesting, and in many ways typical, case study of how serious flaws
in the financial sector can undermine the growth and stability of a
developing nation.  Although each of the Asian countries has its own
pathology, one common thread is that their financial institutions have
played a prominent role in underwriting an unsustainable bubble
economy.  The challenge facing Thailand and the other Asian coun-
tries involves finding a way to repair the damage from this crisis and
to prevent a recurrence by reforming their banking systems.
In contrast to Asia, the United States over the last few years has
enjoyed steady growth with low inflation and unemployment, in addi-
tion to an unprecedented bull stock market.  Despite such impressive
achievements, it would be premature to announce the triumph of
American-style capitalism.  In the not too distant past, America too
had a disastrous experience with its financial system when waves of
* The author wishes to thank Professors Amy Chua and Jim Cox of Duke Law School
for their helpful insight and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Keith B. Richburg & Steven Mufson, In Hindsight, Signs of Asian Crisis Ap-
pear Clear: Bank Loan Problems in 1996 Exposed Mountains of Debt, Shook Investor Confi-
dence, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1998, at A1.
2. See id.
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thrift institutions became insolvent.3  Both the Thai and American
banking crises share several parallels in their origins and dynamics.
After some initial waffling, the United States government re-
solved the savings and loan debacle successfully.  Congress first
passed legislation to tighten and strengthen supervisory powers of
regulators while limiting their discretion to pursue a policy of for-
bearance.  A special government entity, the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration (RTC), was also created to dispose of the assets of troubled
savings institutions.  Employing the expertise of consultants and in-
vestment bankers, the RTC managed both to attract investors and
“maximize” returns by exhibiting extraordinary flexibility and effi-
ciency for a government agency.  This Note explores the appropri-
ateness of using the American solution as a model for remedying
Thailand’s present predicament.  First, the origins of the S&L crisis
will be examined, followed by a description of the regulatory re-
sponse to the problem.  Next, an analysis of the Thai economic crisis
will focus on the shortcomings of the banking system.  Lastly, this
Note will investigate the advantages and obstacles in pursuing an
American solution in Thailand.
II.  CONTEXT OF THE S&L CRISIS
Although commentators disagree on where principal culpability
should lie,4 accounts of the salient events and factors that were in-
volved in the S&L crisis are fairly uniform.  The traditional approach
divides the financial disaster into two distinct segments: the “interest
rate squeeze” from 1979 to 1982, and the “debacle” from 1983 to
1985.5  The former period witnessed a rash of thrift insolvencies in the
3. The terms “S&L’s”, “thrifts”, and “saving institutions” are interchangeable for the
purpose of this Note.
4. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., S&L Closures and Survivors: Are There Systemic Dif-
ferences in Behavior?, in THE CAUSES AND COSTS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION FAILURES 9,
(Allin F. Cottrell et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that incentives derived from S&L ownership struc-
tures were the dominant factor in S&L behavior); Gregory A. Lilly, The Savings and Loan De-
bacle: Moral Hazard or Market Disaster?, in THE CAUSES AND COSTS OF DEPOSITORY IN-
STITUTION FAILURES 119 (Allin F. Cottrell et al. eds., 1995) (contending that market forces,
including the actual and expected inflation of the 1970s and ‘80s, were the root causes of the
S&L failures); Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Reform Issues and the Implications for the
Structure of the American Financial System, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990S 305, 316-22 (J.J. Norton et al.
eds., 1994) (suggesting that regulation rather than deregulation was behind the S&L’s failures).
5. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND
THRIFT REGULATION 67-122 (1991) (using the phrases “interest rate squeeze” and “debacle”
to designate the two periods of the crisis).
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wake of severe macroeconomic disturbances, while the latter period
was characterized by a significant number of S&Ls undertaking ex-
cessive, and ultimately fatal, credit risks.
A basic familiarity with the context in which S&Ls operate is
helpful in understanding the dynamics of the crisis.  The thrift indus-
try was originally conceived as a vehicle to promote home owner-
ship.6  In an effort to make affordable housing a reality, Congress and
state legislatures chartered thrift institutions that were intended to
specialize in home mortgage financing.7
A. The Regulatory Quilt
The present form of the thrift industry traces its roots to the
Great Depression.8  Reacting to the financial turmoil at that time,
Congress enacted three pieces of legislation9 that brought the flagging
thrift industry under federal regulatory control.10  First, Congress
created the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) to provide
emergency financing to member thrift institutions.11  This system was
composed of twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB),
which were headed by the Bank Board.12  Next, in 1933, Congress
authorized the Bank Board to charter thrifts.13  This development re-
sulted in a system of parallel regulatory regimes.  As a result, the
thrift industry consisted of both federal-chartered and state-chartered
savings institutions that were supervised by federal and state agen-
cies, respectively.14  Last, Congress granted the Bank Board the
power to set up the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC).15  This entity insured the time and demand deposits in both
state and federal thrift institutions, and resulted in the partial regula-
6. For a brief history of the S&L industry and relevant legislation, see H.R. REP. NO.
101-54(I), at 290, 291-302 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 87-98.
7. See id. at 294.
8. See id. at 292.
9. These three pieces of legislation were the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub.
L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1994)); the Home
Owner’s Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-42, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
1461-70 (1994)); and the National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246.
10. See Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations under the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW 1013, 1017 (1990)
(providing a historical account of the regulatory framework surrounding thrift institutions).
11. See id.
12. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 1423.
13. See Home Owner’s Loan Act § 1464(a).
14. See Clark et al., supra note 10, at 1017-18.
15. See National Housing Act § 2.
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tion of state-chartered thrifts by the federal government through this
scheme of conditional deposit insurance.16  The FSLIC set the premi-
ums for deposit insurance at a uniform level, without adjustments for
risk.17
Consistent with their assigned mission, S&Ls derived their prof-
its mainly through long-term, fixed-rate home mortgage loans.18
Their liabilities,  on the other hand, consisted of highly liquid demand
deposits.19  This arrangement resulted in a structural vulnerability
where an unexpected rise in interest rates confronted a thrift with a
no-win situation.20  By raising the interest rates it paid in order to re-
tain its depositors, a thrift would operate at a loss because of its in-
ability to raise the lending rates of previous mortgages to compensate
for its increased costs.21  Alternatively, the thrift could maintain the
relatively low interest rate that it paid and expect many of its custom-
ers to withdraw their deposits.  To meet its expenses in that event, the
thrift would be forced to sell a portion of its fixed-rate mortgages at a
depressed price because of the higher prevailing interest rate.22
B. The Interest Rate Squeeze of 1979-1982
The inflationary environment in the 1960s and early 1970s re-
vealed this structural weakness in the thrift industry, which Congress
addressed successfully, albeit temporarily, with the Interest Rate
Control Act of 1966.23  This Act established an interest rate ceiling on
deposits, a limitation that previously applied only to commercial
banks.24  This so-called “Regulation Q” set the interest rate cap for
thrifts at a rate slightly above that allowable for commercial banks.25
16. See Clark et al., supra note 10, at 1018.
17. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 326 (noting that the major defect with deposit insurance is
the taxpayer guarantee to provide a risk-free environment for engaging in high-return, risk-
intensive transactions).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 290, 295 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 91.
19. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 61-62.
20. See id. (describing the dilemma faced by S&Ls in an environment of increasing interest
rates).
21. At this time, federally chartered thrifts could not at this time offer variable rate mort-
gages (ARMs).  See id. at 65.
22. “A long-term, fixed rate mortgage with an option to repay can be viewed as a coupon
bond with a known monthly coupon and an unknown maturity date and face value.  Whenever
interest rates rise, the market value of such assets falls.”  Lilly, supra note 4, at 124.
23. Interest Rate Control Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823; see also WHITE,
supra note 5, at 62-64.
24. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 62.
25. See Lilly, supra note 4, at 124.
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Depositors, who at that time had few comparable investment alterna-
tives, resigned themselves to earning the meager returns paid by de-
pository institutions.26  With Regulation Q in place, the thrift industry
was able to halt a self-destructive bidding war for depositors and
weather the hostile economic conditions.27
The Federal Reserve Bank’s attempt to tame America’s high in-
flation triggered the severe interest rate squeeze of 1979-1982.28
Sharply rising interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s accom-
panied this monetary policy and combined with attractive investment
innovations29 in the financial markets to create a fertile environment
for large-scale “disintermediation.”30  The effect of this disinterme-
diation process was a severe credit shortfall in the construction indus-
try.31  The subsequent hardships experienced by home buyers and the
housing industry persuaded Congress to phase out Regulation Q by
enacting the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act in 1980 (DIDMCA).32  While the Act erased the thrift
industry’s competitive advantage with respect to banks, it also raised
the federal insurance coverage to $100,000 for each account.33  With-
out Regulation Q, thrifts were free to compete for funds by offering
higher yields for their federally insured deposits.
Due to the inherent defect in the thrifts’ balance sheets,34 how-
26. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 64.
27. See id.
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 290, 295 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 91;
WHITE, supra note 5, at 67.
29. For example, money market mutual funds allowed investors to pool their money in
very safe investments such as Treasury bills, high-quality commercial paper, and high-
denomination, short-term CDs offered by commercial banks, thereby obtaining a market rate
of return without incurring significant risk.  See WHITE, supra note 5, at 68-69.  These money
market mutual funds provided an attractive alternative to low interest bearing deposit accounts
in thrift institutions.  See id.
30. Disintermediation occurs when savings formerly held by financial intermediaries are
diverted to financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, and various derivative products—this
may occur, for example, when investors seek to avoid a government-imposed ceiling on the
rate of return.  See Maxwell J. Fry, Summing-up: Three Issues of Financial Reform and Innova-
tion, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND MONETARY POLICY: ASIA AND THE WEST 319, 320-21
(Yoshio Suzuki & Hiroshi Yomo eds., 1986).
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 295.
32. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).  See id. § 202(b); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 294-95 (describing the events leading to the passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act).
33. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act § 308(a)(1).
34. In August 1981, it is estimated that 85% of the thrift industry’s assets were locked up
in long-term, fixed-rate mortgages while high-yielding short-term CDs constituted 53% of its
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ever, attempting to attract depositors with higher interest rates alone
was a doomed strategy.  For example, in 1981, the thrifts’ mortgage
portfolios yielded 10% while the interest rate they paid on their de-
posits had risen to 11% on average.35  The discrepancy in interest
rates soon took its toll on the industry.  The percentage of unprofit-
able federally insured thrifts increased from 2.9% in 1978 to 38.4%
in 1983,36 while the tangible net worth37 of those thrifts tumbled from
5.6% to 0.4% of assets during the same time period.38  Overall, the
industry experienced $4.6 billion in losses and eighty-one failures in
1981.39  In 1982, the thrifts lost another $4.3 billion while 252 more
thrifts were closed; and in 1983, an additional 102 saving institutions
failed.40
C. The Debacle of 1983-1985
In response to the thrift industry’s plight, Congress took a num-
ber of measures to loosen the regulatory constraints on its competi-
tive practices, in the form of the DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Ger-
main Depository Institutions Act of 1982.41  These two statutes, along
with lax regulatory practices, set the stage for a profusion of ex-
tremely risky and sometimes abusive behavior by the S&Ls.
The deregulatory inclinations of Congress was strongly evident
in DIDMCA.  A number of the Act’s provisions, in addition to the
gradual elimination of Regulation Q and the increase in federal de-
posit insurance coverage, strengthened the ability of thrifts to attract
funds.  For example, the Act allowed thrifts to offer more services,
including Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) checking ac-
counts42 and credit cards.43
Several of the changes also gave S&Ls greater discretion and
liabilities.  See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), at 296.
35. See id.
36. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 70.
37. According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), tangible net worth
excludes goodwill as an asset—this exclusion arguably provides a more accurate picture of an
institution’s financial condition, since goodwill can be used to exaggerate the value of its assets.
See id. at 95-96 n.11.
38. See id. at 19.
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 296.
40. See id.
41. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
42. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132.
43. See id. § 402.
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flexibility in managing their assets.  The DIDMCA, for instance, al-
lowed thrifts to place up to 20% of their assets in non-traditional in-
vestments such as commercial real estate and consumer loans, corpo-
rate debt securities, and commercial paper.44 Such portfolio
diversification helped to create more liquidity and greater potential
returns.  The Act also preempted state laws against mortgage usury.45
This step paved the way for the development of adjustable rate mort-
gages (ARMs), an asset that did not contribute to the interest rate
mismatch in the thrifts’ balance sheets.
Perhaps most importantly, the DIDMCA lowered the thrifts’ net
worth requirements.46  Net worth measures the residual value of an
institution after liabilities are deducted from assets,47 and therefore
represents an equity cushion provided by the institution’s owners as a
buttress to insolvency.  Investors would normally allocate their re-
sources based on their assessment of the financial stability of the de-
pository institutions.  Institutions would therefore have an incentive
to be adequately capitalized so as to reassure cautious investors.  In
the context of deposit insurance, however, the level of an institution’s
net worth is dictated generally by regulatory standards instead of
market forces.48  Before DIDMCA’s enactment, thrifts were required
to maintain a net worth of at least 5% of their liabilities.49  Under the
Act, the Bank Board was permitted to set the minimum net worth
requirement between 3-6% of liabilities.50  Exercising its newly estab-
lished authority, the Bank Board lowered the net worth floor to 4%
in 1980 and then to 3% in 1982.  The subsequent reduction in the
S&Ls’ capitalization exposed the FSLIC’s funds to greater potential
losses.  In other words, the buffer separating the thrifts’ liabilities
from the government’s guaranteed insurance obligations had been
degraded.51
Despite these changes, the thrift industry continued its decline
which prompted more deregulatory efforts.  In 1982, Congress en-
44. See id. § 401(c)(2).
45. See id. § 501(a)(1).
46. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 82-87 (arguing that the lowering of net worth and ac-
counting standards exacerbated the risks posed by the industry).
47. See id. at 37.
48. See id at 82.
49. See id.
50. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 409, 94 Stat. 132.
51. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 82.
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acted the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act.52  This Act
broadened the investment opportunities of the thrifts even more by,
among other things, allowing thrifts to invest a larger percentage of
their assets in loans secured by non-residential real estate.53
The Garn-St. Germain Act also diluted the accounting standards
applied to S&Ls.  The Act authorized the Bank Board to issue
promissory notes to thrifts in financial distress in exchange for
“certificates of net worth.”54  Despite being devoid of any real value,
the notes were included as assets and, accordingly, overstated the
thrifts’ actual net worth.55  This practice of note exchanges under-
mined the Bank Board’s already weak accounting standards.
The Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) that applied to
thrifts allowed institutions to continue operating despite a substantial
deterioration in their financial condition.  For example, RAP allowed
thrifts to amortize losses realized on the sale of an asset over its life.56
RAP also allowed thrifts to recognize an appreciation of the ap-
praised market value of assets without a corresponding recognition of
unrealized asset depreciation.57  RAP’s illusory standards enabled
many thrifts to remain technically solvent, although actually insolvent
by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) standards.58
Consequently, the ability of regulators to take corrective actions was
greatly impaired even as the losses to the FSLIC began to mount.59
The Bank Board’s laxity regarding accounting standards and net
worth requirements was consistent with its general policy of regula-
tory forbearance.  Due to the large number of insolvent S&Ls caused
by the soaring interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
FSLIC itself was effectively insolvent.60  In order to avoid cash pay-
ments to depositors pursuant to its insurance guarantee, regulators
had a strong incentive not to recognize explicitly the insolvencies of
52. See id. at 72 (describing the factors motivating further Congressional action).
53. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 322,
96 Stat. 1469 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
54. See id. § 202.
55. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 83.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 84.
58. See id. at 86-87.
59. See id. at 84-85.
60. See Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Cri-
sis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress, 51 J. FIN. 1285, 1285
(1996).
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thrift institutions.61
One strategy for shoring up the thrifts’ finances and preserving
FSLIC funds was to stimulate an infusion of private capital.  “To en-
courage investors to inject funds into insolvent institutions regulators
had to provide special inducements such as lenient enforcement of
capital adequacy requirements and relaxed restrictions on dividend
payments.”62  Another option pursued by the Bank Board was to en-
courage the merger of troubled institutions into stronger ones.63
These deregulatory actions attracted a large amount of invest-
ment capital which fueled an increase in supplier-led speculation and
a real estate boom.64  Consequently, thrifts had both ample funds and
opportunities to make risky investments in the hopes of reaping large
returns and regaining profitability.  With marginal amounts of equity
at stake and deposit insurance as a backup, the risk of negative in-
vestment incomes had little restraining influence on thrift behavior.
In other words, “[o]wners of thinly-capitalized or insolvent thrift in-
stitutions, in turn, had a strong incentive to raise the value of the de-
posit insurance contract through increases in asset risk and capital
distributions to shareholders.”65
During the period 1983-1984, the seemingly revived thrift indus-
try enjoyed tremendous growth.66  While this phenomenon was partly
the result of the overall economic recovery, the growth was also due
to thrift operators taking advantage of expanded opportunities and
capabilities.67  Further contributing to the industry’s expansion was
the entry of entrepreneurs attracted by the favorable investment en-
vironment.68  The growth in the number and size of S&Ls, however,
61. See id. at 1286.
62. Id. at 1286.  Kroszner and Strahan argue that insolvent or thinly-capitalized mutual
thrifts had incentives to convert into stock thrifts with the regulators’ blessings.  The stock form
allowed thrifts to pay higher dividends which increased the costs of the S&L clean-up.
63. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 84.
64. See Barney Warf & Joseph C. Cox, Spatial Dimensions of the Savings and Loan Crisis,
27 GROWTH & CHANGE 135, 138 (1996).
65. Kroszner & Strahan, supra note 60, at 1285-86.
66. Annual growth rates for thrifts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) were 18.6% and 19.9% for 1983 and 1984, respectively.  See WHITE, su-
pra note 5, at 100.
67. See id. at 101-02.
68. See id. at 105.  Evidence of increased entrepreneurial activity derives from two
sources.  First, the number of new thrifts receiving approval for FSLIC deposit insurance
jumped from 119 during 1980-1982 to 268 during 1983-1985.  See id.  Second, the number of
mutual to stock conversions between 1983-1985 tripled the previous three years.  See id. at 106.
The increase in stock conversions can be attributed in part to new entrepreneurs gaining con-
trol of nearly bankrupt institutions and applying for permission to convert to stock form.  See
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masked the steadily deteriorating quality of many thrifts’ assets.
A similar pattern was developing in the regulatory scheme at the
state level, a significant phenomenon given that 51% of FSLIC-
insured thrifts were state-chartered in 1980.69  In an attempt to pre-
vent their savings institutions from converting to federal charters,
state legislatures went to even greater lengths to deregulate their
thrift industries.70  The most notable states in this regard were Cali-
fornia, Texas, and Florida.71
The policy of forbearance notwithstanding, the FHLB Board
could not provide a meaningful check on the risk-taking S&Ls.  Im-
bued with the philosophy of down-sizing government, the Reagan
“[a]dministration would not support an increase in the number of
savings and loan examiners even though the thrift industry was going
through its most significant restructuring since the Great Depres-
sion.”72  Furthermore, both managers of thrifts and S&L examiners
were ill-equipped at that time to assess the risks of unfamiliar and
complex transactions.73  As a result, gross mismanagement and out-
right fraud flourished, adding to the costs of thrift resolutions.
Nevertheless, most thrift insolvencies were not the result of
fraud, but were rather the product of risky, poorly planned decisions
made against the backdrop of a fizzling real estate market.74  Moreo-
ver, the enormous costs of the S&L crisis were caused by only a mi-
nority of the thrifts that had gambled fabulously.75  In the aftermath
of the debacle, cleanup of state-chartered thrifts in California and
Texas alone consumed roughly 70% of the FSLIC’s budget.76
Evidence of trouble in the industry began to surface in 1984,77
but the full extent of the problem took a few more years to register.78
Finally facing up to the situation, the Bank Board promulgated new
id. at 106.
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 297 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 93.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 301.
73. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 76.
74. See id. at 117.
75. See id. at 81.
76. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I) at 297.
77. Questions concerning the fitness of the thrift industry were raised after the failure of
Empire Savings in Mesquite, Texas in early 1984.  See WHITE, supra note 5, at 125.
78. An overly-lenient accounting system required time to reflect financial difficulties.  See
id. at 112.  Furthermore, a real estate downturn after 1984 sounded the death knell for the debt-
laden thrifts.  See id. at 113.
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and more stringent regulations for the industry beginning in 1984.  It
established an annual growth rate ceiling that was adjusted down-
ward for thinly-capitalized thrifts, set the net worth standards at 6%
of liabilities (although certain qualifying thrifts could maintain a
slightly lower equity cushion), restricted certain categories of invest-
ment by some function of tangible net worth; reinstated GAAP stan-
dards in lieu of RAP, and beefed up the number and quality of S&L
examiners.79  As the costs for resolving insolvent thrifts began to
swell,80 it became painfully apparent that the FSLIC was insufficiently
funded to meet its obligations.81  Congress attempted a recapitaliza-
tion of the FSLIC when it passed the Competitive Equality Act of
1987 (CEBA).82  This Act set up the so-called Financing Corporation
(FICO)83 to raise $10.8 billion for the FSLIC.84  Costs, however, con-
tinued to escalate and “[b]y the end of 1988, the thrift industry crisis
had become a major political issue and a top priority of the incoming
Bush administration.”85
III.  RESOLVING THE S&L CRISIS
Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation to resolve the
crisis and stabilize the thrift industry.  The stated purpose of the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA)86 was to resuscitate and reform the federal deposit insur-
ance system and to strengthen the supervisory and enforcement pow-
ers of regulators.87  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 (FDICIA)88 set up an improved regulatory
79. See id. at 128-31.
80. In 1984, the FSLIC’s total income from deposit insurance premiums and accrued in-
terest was $1.325 billion with “net reserves” of another $5.6 billion.  Resolution of the seventy-
one thrifts insolvent under the Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) at the end of 1984
would have required approximately $15 billion.  See id. at 135.
81. “While the exact timing of FSLIC’s insolvency and its realization by the regulators is
difficult to determine, most observers would not put the date later than 1982.”  Kroszner &
Strahan, supra note 60, at 1286 n.3.
82. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified
at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
83. See id. § 302(a).
84. See id. § 302(e)(1)(B).
85. Clark et al., supra note 10, at 1015.
86. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
87. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 307-08 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 103-104.
88. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
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framework to supervise depository institutions and effectuate needed
corrective measures.
A. The Legislative Response
To address the task of resolving insolvent thrifts, FIRREA first
established the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP) to
provide the financing for clean-up operations.89  Congress initially
authorized REFCORP to issue $30 billion in government debt securi-
ties.90  FIRREA then established the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) to direct the resolution of thrifts, and the Oversight Board to
oversee the RTC.91  The RTC’s purpose was to “manage and resolve
all cases involving depository institutions” that had been previously
insured by the FSLIC.92  The RTC’s mandate required it to maximize
the returns on asset disposition without disrupting local real estate
and financial markets.93
In an attempt to prevent a recurrence of this financial calamity,
FIRREA included several provisions designed to improve the regula-
tory structure.  Animated by the belief that conflicts of interest
within the Bank Board undermined the previous FHLBS,94 Congress
abolished the Board95 and transferred its responsibilities of regulating
and chartering thrifts to a new division of the Department of Treas-
ury, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).96  The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) assumed the management of thrifts’
deposit insurance.97
In enacting FIRREA, Congress realized the importance of
stronger capital requirements and the role that excessively lax ac-
89. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 511(a).
90. See id. sec. 511(a), § 21B(f)(1).  The interest of the bonds were to be paid for by earn-
ings on assets owned by the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP), Bank Board con-
tributions, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) proceeds generated through the liquidation or
sale of insolvent thrifts, and Treasury appropriations.  See id. sec. 511(a), § 21B(f)(2).  Pay-
ments on the principal of the debt were to be covered through income produced by non-interest
bearing instruments purchased through assessments levied on the regional FHLBS banks, de-
posit insurance premiums, and receivership proceeds.  See id. sec. 511(a), § 21B(f)(3).
91. See id. sec. 501.
92. Id. sec. 501, § 21A(b)(3)(A)(b).
93. See id. sec. 501, § 21A(b)(3)(C).
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 302 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N 98.
95. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 401(a).
96. See id. § 401(e).
97. See id. § 202.  FIRREA gave the FDIC control over two separate funds, the Bank In-
surance Fund for commercial banks, and the Savings Association Insurance Fund for S&Ls.
See id. § 206(a)(7).
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counting played in the S&L debacle.98  To better ensure the adequate
capitalization of thrift institutions, FIRREA mandated a capital re-
quirement of only 3% of assets, but added risk-based adjustments
similar to the capital standards applied to commercial banks.99  In the
same vein, FIRREA required the use of certified or licensed apprais-
ers in real estate related transactions and the application of uniform
real estate appraisal standards.100  These modifications were intended
to prevent the abusive practice of inflating estimates of real estate
values to secure a larger loan.101  Finally, FIRREA also strengthened
the enforcement powers of regulators and stiffened the criminal and
civil penalties for crimes associated with financial institutions.102
The FDICIA represented a further effort to tighten the thrift’s
regulatory scheme.  This Act attempted to constrict the regulatory
discretion of S&L examiners and to eliminate the previous “too big
to fail” policy.103  On-site examinations of all insured institutions were
required104 and accounting methods were tightened.105  Regulators,
armed with up-to-date information, could then act promptly at signs
of trouble.106  Different levels of regulatory scrutiny were applied to
different segments of the industry.  For example, large institutions
are required to have quarterly financial reports prepared by inde-
pendent public accountants.107
B. The Mechanics of the RTC
Many observers in the financial community have heralded the
RTC as a resounding success.108  In its six years of existence, the RTC
had resolved 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered $395 billion of the
$456 billion in its charge.109  The taxpayers’ burden for the clean-up
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 310.
99. See id. at 310-11.
100. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 §§ 1101-22.
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 311 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N 98.
102. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 §§ 961-68.
103. H.R. REP. NO. 102-330, at 96 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1909.
104. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)) sec. 111,
§ 10(d)(1).
105. See id. sec. 112, § 36(b).
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-330, at 99.
107. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 sec. 112, §
36(g)(2).
108. See, e.g., Dean Foust, The RTC’s Epitaph: It Worked, BUS. WK., Jan. 15, 1996, at 29;
Jeffrey Marshall, Learning from the RTC, U.S. BANKER, Sep. 1993, at 28.
109. See Foust, supra note 108.
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was just under $145 billion, an amount far less than many experts had
predicted.110  After only three years, the agency sold over $330 billion
of assets at an outstanding 92% of book value.111  Although many of
these assets were difficult to dispose of, the RTC succeeded by em-
ploying many innovative strategies,112 and by 1995 the thrift industry
was earning a healthy $7.6 billion in annual profits.113  The RTC had
accomplished its mission so expeditiously that it shut its doors one
year ahead of its December 31, 1996 sunset expiration date.114
Nevertheless, given its high profile status in a politically sensitive
area, the agency has had its share of critics.  Detractors of the RTC
have leveled various charges of mismanagement, including the exces-
sive use of expensive consultants as well as outright fraudulent billing
by contractors.115  Other critics have contended that the agency had
hastily unloaded its assets at bargain prices to the benefit of wealthy
investors and detriment of taxpayers.116
The RTC faced a daunting challenge not only because of the
enormity and political sensitivity of its task, but also because its
fleeting life-span made it difficult to recruit quality personnel.117  Al-
though the agency undoubtedly made mistakes,118 the general consen-
sus is that the RTC was a rare example of a government agency that
operated efficiently and effectively.
When a thrift fell below the prescribed minimum net worth re-
quirement or became insolvent, the chartering authority would close
down the institution, and the RTC would then take control of the de-
funct thrift and hold it in conservatorship.119  The resolution of the in-
solvent S&L would then involve an attempt by the RTC to sell the
institution intact, or alternatively, to liquidate its assets.120  If the at-
110. See id.  In 1993, after the agency had sold the bulk of its assets, many economists still
expected costs to climb to $200 billion, or $500 billion when interest payments were factored
into the calculation.  See Marshall, supra note 108.
111. See Birge Watkins, RTC Finds Assets in 1993 Far More Manageable, NAT’L REAL
ESTATE INV., Apr. 1993, at 66, 66.
112. See Dean Foust, ‘Now They’re Really Down to the Dregs,’ BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 1993, at
80.
113. See 1995 FDIC ANN. REP. 10.
114. See Foust, supra note 108; Watkins, supra note 111.
115. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 34-35.
116. See Foust, supra note 108.
117. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 34.
118. “[Former RTC Senior Vice-President for Asset Sales Lamar] Kelly believes that mis-
takes were made, but says the staff has been ‘superb’.”  Id.
119. See 1995 FDIC ANN. REP. 23-25.
120. See Leonard Sahling, Managing the Cleanup of the Thrift Crisis, REAL ESTATE REV.,
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tempted sale proved to be only partially successful, the RTC would
hold residual assets in receivership.121
The real estate related assets that the agency put up for sale in-
cluded a wide variety of projects, including raw land, malls, hotels,
and office buildings.122  The thrifts, however, also invested in a myriad
of other kinds of assets, which made the resolution process even
more cumbersome.123  To make matters worse, FIRREA imposed
various restrictions on how thrifts’ assets could be sold.124
The disposal of highly liquid assets at fair market value posed no
great difficulty.  “[G]overnment securities, single-family mortgage-
backed bonds, high-yield bonds and non-mortgage loans (especially
those to consumers)” could be easily unloaded in well-developed
secondary markets.125  By contrast, tainted assets such as non-
performing mortgages, charge offs, and judgments were harder to sell
and required more complicated, innovative procedures.126  To sur-
mount these obstacles, the RTC employed three major techniques:
bulk sales, auctions, and mortgage securitization.127
In response to the unwillingness of many banks to acquire assets
of dubious quality, the RTC assembled those assets in large, bulk-sale
packages, whose composition attracted institutional investors.128  The
first bulk sale was closed in March 1991, when a portfolio of non-
performing commercial mortgages and Real Estate Owned (REO)
properties was sold to a conglomerate.129  The proceeds from that
transaction amounted to $122 million for a pool of assets with a book
value of $180 million.130  Despite the deep discount, this sale could be
considered a success for the RTC considering the nature of the assets
being marketed. 131  Subsequently, numerous such deals were put to-
Winter 1993, at 52 n.1.
121. See id.
122. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 29.
123. These assets ranged from interests in highly leveraged transactions to office furniture
and supplies.  See id. at 29-30.
124. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 54.  See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (1994)) sec. 501(a), § 21A(b)(3)(C)(ii) (prohibiting the RTC from disposing of real
estate assets in a manner disruptive to commercial property markets).
125. Sahling, supra note 120, at 53.
126. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 30.
127. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 54.
128. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 30.
129. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 54-56.
130. See id.
131. Sale of Real Estate Owned (REO) assets in 1993 typically recouped only 38% of the
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gether132 with the value of packages offered averaging $3-4 million.133
In addition to bulk sales, the agency sold assets at auctions.
During the auction process, the RTC contracted with a sales agent to
manage the disposal of a particular portfolio.134  The agent was re-
sponsible for implementing all the steps necessary for an auction,
which included marketing the asset pool, accepting inquiries, proc-
essing the required government forms, operating the auction, and
choosing the winning bid.135  Auctions offered the RTC the advantage
of presenting large amounts of assets to the market, while minimizing
overhead costs.136
The other major process that the agency used to dispose of assets
was securitization.137  The structure of each securitization transaction
depended on the nature of the underlying asset.  For example, single-
family home mortgages, which comprised the majority of the RTC’s
performing loans, were often disposed of in this manner.138  Normally,
performing mortgages could be sold in the market separately or in
pools without resorting to securitization.139  However, investors often
viewed the creditworthiness of real estate related assets with skepti-
cism.140  This pessimism caused investors to demand higher premiums,
making whole-loan sales economically impractical.141  In search of a
more attractive alternative,142 the RTC turned to securitization.
The RTC developed its own securitization model for mortgage-
properties’ book value.  See Marshall, supra note 108, at 34.
132. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 54-56 (chronicling a series of RTC-sponsored bulk
sales).
133. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 34.
134. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 56.
135. See id.
136. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 34.  “‘Auctions give us a chance to expose a large vol-
ume of assets to the marketplace and dispose of them with a substantial reduction in overhead,’
says Ron Cline, director of the RTC National Sales Center in Washington.”  Id.
137. For a description of the securitization process, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994).
138. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 57.
139. See id. at 57 n.5.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Thrifts requiring liquidity often sold mortgages to the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac) if the
mortgages conformed to those agencies’ standards.  See id. at 57.  By the time a thrift’s financial
condition forced it into RTC receivership, few conforming mortgages remained.  See id.  Con-
sequently, this avenue of asset disposition was not a viable option for the RTC.  See id.  Fur-
thermore, traditional buyers of whole-loans such as banks and insurance companies, were sub-
ject to tighter risk-based capital requirements.  See id.
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backed securities (MBS) known as Ritzy Maes.143  One feature of
these securities was that they were issued in a registered offering.144
The disclosure requirements of registration provided investors with
access to substantial information about the risks of the underlying
mortgages, thereby increasing the liquidity of the securities.  The fact
that the collateral backing the securities was typically held in trust145
further reassured investors that the mortgage pool would be under
unitary control.  Finally, through use of credit enhancement tech-
niques (usually in the form of reserve funds),146 the securities were
able to achieve a sufficiently high investment rating to entice institu-
tional investors.147
Compared to the market for single-family MBS, the market for
securities backed by multi-family mortgages (i.e., commercial resi-
dential mortgages) was relatively undeveloped.148  The RTC was
something of a trailblazer in the development of marketable securi-
ties of this kind.149  The multi-family MBS incorporated the same ba-
sic features of the single-family MBS, but required increased credit
enhancement mechanisms to achieve comparable credit ratings.150
While the major risk accompanying single-family mortgages was the
possibility that borrowers would retire their loans ahead of schedule,
residential commercial mortgages posed relatively insignificant pre-
payment risk.151  Instead, multi-family mortgages involved a greater
risk of default152 stemming from the precarious position of business
enterprises.  Securities backed by such mortgages therefore required
more extensive insurance that payments will continue despite higher
rates of default.  Thus, credit enhancement for multi-family MBS of-
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Cash reserves ensure that the investors’ principal and interest will be repaid on time.
See Marshall, supra note 108, at 37.
147. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 57.  “Senior-subordinated structures are sometimes
used to provide supplementary credit enhancement, to improve marketability, and to reserve
the size of reserve funds.”  Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 58. “They basically created the market, for both secured and unsecured
loans.  The securitization market had been inefficient and very expensive; the technology for
deals was all over the board.  They helped develop a market that seemed to be going no-
where.”  Marshall, supra note 108, at 35 (quoting the kudos given by a newsletter editor to the
RTC’s pioneering securitization program).
150. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 58.
151. See id.
152. See id.
LIMFINAL2.DOC 04/02/99  3:08 PM
360 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:343
ten totaled between 32% to 45% of the amount of the offering.153
Securities backed by non-residential commercial mortgages en-
tailed even greater protection requirements for investors.  Besides
the significant credit enhancement features of multi-family MBS, the
non-residential commercial MBS established a “special servicer” to
handle any mortgages in the pool that became non-performing.154 The
servicer’s responsibility was to review those cases and take whatever
appropriate measures155 were needed to minimize losses.
From its inception, the agency had a powerful motivation to re-
solve failed institutions quickly.  Not only did the value of “bad as-
sets” shrink over time, but the carrying costs and management fees
for real estate property also placed a significant drain on the RTC’s
limited funds.156  This situation fostered a pervasive deal-making
ethos in the RTC.  As a result, efficiency and flexibility became two
important principles in structuring transactions.
The RTC enlisted the aid of big-name consultants and invest-
ment bankers to put together large deals.157  Although many critics
decried the heavy involvement of Wall Street firms because of cost158
and equity concerns,159 the expertise of such players were needed to
expedite the transactions and maximize value.  “The big investment
banks have the market clout and the expertise to structure and move
big asset packages; to minimize their role could have slowed the sales
process to a crawl.”160
In addition, the RTC showed a great deal of flexibility in work-
ing with investors.  In packaging bulk sales, for example, the RTC
allowed interested parties to modify the pool of assets being offered,
as long as they didn’t engage in  “cherry-picking” where only the best
153. See id.  The amount of reserve funds for multi-family mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) commonly ranged from 25-35% compared with 10-27% for single-family MBS.  See id.
Additionally, multi-family MBS tended to employ senior-subordinated structures more often to
boost the credit rating.  See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Marshall, supra note 108, at 30.
157. See id.
158. See Albert R. Karr & John Connor, Wall Street Cashes in on RTC’s Program, WALL
ST. J., June 15, 1993, at C1 (reporting that eleven firms earned almost $250 million in under-
writing fees in the RTC’s securitization program).
159. Smaller firms complained that they were unfairly excluded from the process by the
same firms that sold billions of dollars worth of junk bonds to the faltering S&L industry.  See
Marshall, supra note 108, at 30.
160. Id.
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assets were selected.161  As an inducement to some investors, the RTC
had also provided seller financing.  “The theory is that if you can sell
it and get a substantial enough down payment, you’re just as well off
selling it, even if you need to foreclose at a later date.”162
In structuring many of the transactions, the RTC insured that it
would receive a share of any potential profits from distressed assets.
By retaining an equity stake in certain projects, the agency would get
a cut of the up-side potential of the assets being sold.  For example,
the RTC turned down two offers to buy a 21,000-acre residential de-
velopment outside of Phoenix for a reported $17 million in cash be-
cause it felt that it would benefit more by selling only a 25% stake in
the project.163
Overall, the RTC’s resolution of the insolvent thrifts was an ex-
tremely successful process.  In light of the speed and efficiency with
which an enormous amount of distressed assets were sold and
“maximum” returns realized, the RTC provided a possible template
for other countries whose banking systems are being crushed from
the weight of bad loans.  The recent souring of Asia’s economies can
be largely attributed to deficiencies in the banking sector.  Thailand,
the first country to stumble in the crisis, provides an interesting case
study for two reasons.  First, in several respects Thailand’s financial
problems are symptomatic of the weaknesses hobbling many coun-
tries in the region.  Second, the origins of Thailand’s financial prob-
lems have some significant parallels with the United States crisis.
These similarities raise the question of whether any lessons from the
American experience can be exported.
IV.  THAILAND’S BANKING CRISIS
The wholesale transplantation of one country’s solutions to an-
other warrants a cautionary note.  “Each country has [its own] un-
derlying political, economic, sociological, legal, and institutional con-
ditions that are unique to it, all of which will influence its
development approach,”164 including the manner in which it resolves
its internal problems.  Although the idiosyncrasies of one country
should not automatically preclude the application of its strategy to
161. See Sahling, supra note 120, at 56.
162. Marshall, supra note 108, at 30 (quoting the former RTC Senior Vice-President of As-
set Sales).
163. See Foust, supra note 112.
164. SEQUENCING?: FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2-3 (Alison
Harwood & Bruce L.R. Smith eds., 1997).
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other contexts, such an endeavor requires case-by-case tailoring.  In
this regard, it is necessary to examine the context of Thailand’s
banking crisis in order to understand the relevance of the S&L expe-
rience in the United States.
A. The Context of Thailand’s Economic Problems
Throughout most of the last three decades, the economies of
Asia recorded enviable rates of economic growth.  The amount of
economic activity in the Asian-Pacific region grew in real terms from
an average annual GDP rate of 5.5% between 1971-81 to 7.1% be-
tween 1982-1992.165  In comparison, the real GDP growth rates fell
during the same time periods from 2.9% to 2.8% in industrial coun-
tries and from 5.1% to 2.0% in the developing countries of the West-
ern Hemisphere.166
By the mid-1990s, however, Thailand’s economic expansion be-
gan to decelerate significantly.  In 1996, its GDP growth rate slowed
to 7% from the previous year’s 8.6% clip.167  Economists have cited
the “weakness of the G-7 industrial countries and an inventory ad-
justment in the global electronics industry” as main reasons for the
slowdown in Thailand’s export-driven economy.168  In January 1997,
the Thai government revised its projected GDP growth rate for 1997
downward, due to poor results in the manufacturing sector and a
large budget deficit in the last quarter of 1996.169
At the beginning of 1998, the Thai baht became the target of a
speculative attack.170  Although the Bank of Thailand (BOT), Thai-
land’s central bank,171 had obstinately refused to allow a currency de-
165. See Maxwell J. Fry, Finance and Growth in Pacific Basin Developing Countries, in
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THEORY AND EXPERIENCES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 138, 140 (Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink eds., 1996).
166. See id.
167. See Michael Vatikiotis, The Burden of Baht, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 20, 1997, at 72.
168. Thailand, like many other East Asian countries, depends heavily on exports to power
its growth.  See The East Asian Financial Crisis and the World Economy: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on
Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 59-64 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings] ((testimony of
David Hale, Chief Global Economist for Zurich Kemper Investments).  Consequently, slug-
gishness in the world’s major economies translates into a reduced demand for Thailand’s goods
and services.  On the supply-side of the equation, a build-up of inventories must at some point
be reduced before new goods can be produced.  This, in turn, leads to a reduction in output.
169. See Vatikiotis, supra note 167.
170. See id.
171. The Bank of Thailand supervises commercial banking.  See Cynthia Pornvalai & Colin
Perry, Thailand, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING: LAW AND REGULATION 1, 1 (Dennis Campbell
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valuation, the band around which the baht was allowed to fluctuate
was moderately widened in February.172  The baht subsequently
dropped by over 2%, but only after the BOT had expended roughly
$3 billion of its foreign reserves to defend the currency.173  Investors,
concerned that the baht’s weakness reflected broader economic in-
firmities, dumped their equities and by February 12, sent the Stock
Exchange of Thailand down 14% from its mid-January high.174  Fi-
nally on July 2, 1997, the BOT allowed the baht to float, and the Thai
currency immediately dropped by about 15%.175
The problems besetting Thailand stem to a large extent from
economic policies that had become inappropriate to many of the
country’s changing domestic and international realities.176  Until the
recent currency crisis last year, Thailand had more or less maintained
a pegged exchange-rate policy.  From 1970 until 1984, the Thai baht
had been closely tied to the U.S. dollar with only two parity adjust-
ments.177  In 1984, the BOT modified the exchange rate scheme to set
the peg according to a basket of currencies.178  One possible benefit of
the pegged exchange rate policy is the containment of rampant infla-
tion.179  While this exchange policy could arguably be effective in
achieving some domestic economic objectives,180 its entrenchment in
ed., 1998).
172. See Vatikiotis, supra note 167.
173. See id.  Paul Krugman provides an economic model for understanding the dynamics of
a speculative currency attack in the context of a fixed exchange rate.  See PAUL KRUGMAN,
CURRENCIES AND CRISIS 68-74 (1992) (arguing that a country’s balance-of-payment problem
leads to dwindling foreign reserves and that speculators, who anticipate the abandonment of a
country’s fixed exchange rate, will seek to acquire its foreign reserves and capture windfall
gains).
174. See Vatikiotis, supra note 167.
175. See Michael Vatikiotis, Free at Last, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 10, 1997, at 70.
176. See generally Hearings, supra note 168.
177. See John G. Greenwood, Financial Liberalization and Innovation in Seven East Asian
Economies, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND MONETARY POLICY: ASIA AND THE WEST 79, 94
(Yoshio Suzuki & Hiroshi Yomo eds., 1986).
178. See id.
179. For example, Chile used its fixed exchange rate regime to curb its inflation problems
during the 1970s.  See Hans Visser & Ingmar van Herpt, Financial Liberalization and Financial
Fragility, in FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THEORY AND EXPE-
RIENCES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 287, 288-89 (Niel Hermes & Robert Lensink, eds.,
1996).  In a manner similar to that in Thailand, the real exchange rate fell (i.e., foreign goods
became cheaper vis-à-vis domestic goods) causing a real appreciation in the Chilean peso.  The
accompanying capital inflows fueled an economic boom but created a large current account
deficit.  When foreign funds stopped flowing to Chile in 1982, the combination of bad debts and
high exposure to dollar denominated loans forced Chile to float its exchange rate.
180. See WILBERT O. BASCOM, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING
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the face of changing conditions could produce unintended conse-
quences.181  In the 1990s, keeping pace with the rapid evolution of
capital markets has been one of the most formidable challenges for
emerging market countries.  Thus, “[a]s a result of the virtually fixed
exchange rate regime and the absence of controls on capital move-
ment, the combination of domestic monetary arrangements existent
in Thailand—which included credit controls and interest rate ceil-
ings—was unsustainable in the face of large and variable interna-
tional capital flows.”182
In maintaining its pegged exchange rate policy, the BOT was
forced to set its interest rates at a level dictated by prevailing U.S.
monetary policies.183  Furthermore, Thailand was subject to changes
in its trade competitiveness based on the relative strength of the dol-
lar.184  This effective abdication of its monetary control rendered
Thailand extremely vulnerable to external forces.  Thailand’s par-
tially deregulated monetary system came under increased pressure as
the global financial system experienced more volatility.  “The grow-
ing internationalization of business and finance and the vast increase
in the speed and volume of information flows have allowed much
more rapid reassessment of and response to the real growth possibili-
ties in many developing countries.”185
During the early 1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank lowered
interest rates to spur economic growth in the domestic economy and
help its beleaguered banking system.186  This policy obliged Thailand
to follow suit and pursue a policy of easy credit.  The following eco-
nomic expansion attracted an influx of foreign funds that continued
to fuel the rapid growth of Thailand and many other Asian econo-
mies.  The flow of private foreign investment into emerging markets
expanded tremendously in the 1990s because the allure of potential
returns there was much higher than that of investments in industrial
countries.187
East Asia, as a result of its strong economic record and hospita-
COUNTRIES 60 (1994).
181. “[A] pegged exchange rate might be attractive where reducing inflation is a policy pri-
ority, while a floating exchange rate might be appropriate when foreign exchange reserves are
low and balance of payments correction is an important concern.”  Id. at 66-67.
182. Greenwood, supra note 177.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. THE WORLD BANK, MANAGING CAPITAL FLOW IN EAST ASIA 6-7 (1996).
186. See generally Hearings, supra note 168.
187. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 185, at 5.
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ble investment environment, became a favorite destination for for-
eign capital.188  It is estimated that the region’s share of foreign direct
and portfolio investment is over half of the total directed towards de-
veloping countries.189  Japan, in particular, was responsible for fund-
ing the burgeoning Asian economies.  Japanese banks, confronted by
an anemic domestic market, invested heavily in Asia and especially in
Thailand.190
Large capital infusions into Thailand produced a large current
account deficit.191  By mid-1997, Thailand’s deficit was running at
about 8% of its GDP.192  As a consequence of its fixed exchange rate
regime and the correlative interest rate differentials, U.S. dollars ap-
peared to be relatively “cheap” to borrowers in Thailand.193  Many
Thai companies exploited the situation and obtained a large volume
of dollar denominated loans.194  These companies, however, chose not
to hedge currency risks because of their steadfast faith in the stability
of Thailand’s pegged exchange rate.195
The establishment of Thailand’s Bangkok International Banking
Facility (BIBF) was an important factor in expediting this process of
foreign capital infusion.  The BIBF system was designed to be a
catalyst for providing financing for infrastructure development and
industrial projects in Thailand and in Southeast Asia.196 The BIBF
was established in 1993 as a critical part of Thailand’s plan to become
a regional financial center.197  Banks with BIBF licenses were author-
ized by the government to engage in foreign currency lending.198  In
1994 and 1995, these banks made loans totaling $29.2 billion and
$41.1 billion, respectively.199  The potential danger of the BIBF sys-
188. See id. at 7.
189. See id. at 9.
190. Thailand owes $37.5 billion of its $70 billion foreign private debt to Japanese banks.
See Japan to the Rescue, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1997, at 89, 89.
191. See Visser & Van Herpt, supra note 179.
192. See Brian Mertens & Cris Prystay, Racing to Stop the Fall, ASIAN BUS., July 1997, at
14, 15.
193. Foreign banks with branches in Asian countries could offer cheap financing for two
reasons: first, “because U.S. interest rates were lower than local interest rates, and [,] second
because the foreign bank could borrow in the Euro currency markets at more favorable rates
than any Asian bank.”  Greenwood, supra note 177, at 79.
194. See generally Hearings, supra note 168.
195. See Cherie Marriott, Thailand at a Standstill, GLOBAL FIN., Oct. 1996, at 34, 38.
196. See Cris Prystay, Rocky Road to Liberalization, ASIAN BUS., Nov. 1996, at 52, 54.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
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tem was that it could also funnel overseas capital to Thai customers,
thus increasing Thailand’s reliance on foreign short-term debt and
exacerbating the current account deficit.200  In 1995, BIBF loans
amounted to 57.7% of the country’s short-term debt.201
In summary, the partially deregulated financial system in Thai-
land distorted the cost of capital and created a huge demand for dol-
lar denominated loans.  The influx of capital financed a superabun-
dance of ill-advised property development projects and a speculative
bubble in other investments.202  Thailand has since lost favor in the in-
ternational capital markets due to its fundamental economic weak-
nesses.  One of the most crucial challenges facing Thailand is the ref-
ormation of its faltering banking system.
B. The Thai Banking Crisis and the BOT’s Response
In September 1997, Thai banks and finance companies203 carried
an estimated $31 billion in non-performing loans.204  The BOT had
announced that non-performing loans comprised 8.15% of the com-
mercial banks’ portfolio in June 1997, but many analysts believed
that the actual figure had been greatly understated.205  Standard &
Poor’s, for example, placed the number between 11% to 13% on a
ninety-day past due basis.206  These numbers would have appeared
even more ominous if the financial statistics for the finance compa-
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Michael Dooley, Globalization, Speculative Bubbles, and Central Banking, in
FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND STABILITY: EXPERIENCES IN
SELECTED ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 103, 105 (Shakil Faruqi ed., 1994)
(examining the phenomenon of speculative bubbles which result from short-term capital in-
flows).
203. The principal law governing commercial banking in Thailand is the Commercial
Banking Act B.E. 2505 (1962), which defines a commercial bank as a “business of accepting
deposits of money subject to withdrawal on demand or at the end of a specified period and of
employing that money in activities, such as granting credits, buying and selling bills of exchange
and other negotiable instruments, and buying and selling foreign exchange.”  Pornvalai &
Perry, supra note 171.  Aside from commercial banks, a number of other institutions, such as
finance, insurance and credit companies, also engage in banking activities.  See id.  “A finance
company is able to make loans, although usually at higher interest rates and with shorter re-
payment periods than bank loans.  It procures funds by borrowing or accepting deposits from
the public, which is then used to finance commercial, development, consumer, and housing
projects.  A credit company lends on the security of a mortgage of immovable property or a
sale of immovable property with a right of redemption.”  Id. at 4.
204. See Michael Vatikiotis, Tainted Technocrats, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 4, 1997, at 60,
60.
205. See Alison Warner, Asian Meltdown, THE BANKER, Dec. 1997, at 39, 40.
206. See id.
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nies had also been included.207  In 1998, non-performing loans of Thai
banks are estimated to amount to roughly a third of their total lend-
ing.208  This percentage is expected to climb to a staggering 40% in the
first half of 1999 as the fallout from the economic contraction contin-
ues to be felt.209
The prime cause of the financial industry’s present predicament
is its heavy exposure to the over-saturated real estate sector.  In the
period before the current crisis, the country’s ninety-one finance
companies pursued a high growth strategy involving extensive lend-
ing to the property market.210  During the period of large foreign capi-
tal inflows, the financial institutions had underwritten the rapid pro-
fusion of real estate projects using the property itself as collateral.211
In a speculative bubble, however, the market prices of real estate are
grossly out of proportion to their underlying economic value.  As the
legacy of poor investment decisions began to manifest itself in the
form of higher default rates, the financial industry was left with col-
lateral worth a fraction of the amount of loans outstanding.212
In Bangkok, for example, approximately 760,000 housing units
were built during the period from 1992 to 1996, but 20% of these are
unoccupied.213  Their construction contributed to a pre-existing sur-
plus of housing which brought the number of empty units to 350,000
in Bangkok and 850,000 throughout Thailand.214  Experts estimate
that this oversupply represents more than six years of demand.215  The
situation for office space is equally bleak.  It is estimated that 50% of
the new supply is expected to remain without tenants for the next
four years.216
The financial industry’s troubles are compounded by the dis-
tressed situation of its corporate clients.  A large segment of Thai-
land’s corporate sector developed in the heyday of easy credit during
the late 1980s and early 1990s.217  Many of these young companies do
207. See id.
208. See More Banks Seen Swallowing Pride, Seeking Government Help, BUS. DAY (Thail.),
Sept. 10, 1998, at 1, available in  1998 WL 17480444.
209. See id.
210. See Alison Warner, Thailand’s Tremors, THE BANKER, May 1997, at 70.
211. See Henny Sender, The Devil to Pay, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 5, 1997, at 50.
212. See id.
213. See Draw the Blinds, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 78.
214. See id.
215. See Warner, supra note 205.
216. See id.
217. See Marriott, supra note 195, at 34.
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not have the experience or resources to survive difficult economic
times.  Although the corporate sector had invested aggressively dur-
ing this period, little attention was paid to the business justifications
for this expansion.  Since 1990, the level of investment by Thai com-
panies grew at a rate of 16% per annum.218  This tremendous growth
had been achieved through financing from the banking sector, which
itself had been increasing its rate of lending by 20% a year.219  The
earnings of companies outside of the banking and telecommunica-
tions sectors, however, had been growing only at a modest 1% rate
per year.220
In addition to the profligate borrowing practices of Thailand’s
companies, their assumption of enormous unhedged dollar liabilities
left the corporate sector extremely exposed to a devaluation of the
baht.221  The government attempted to reduce the inflow of foreign
capital in a series of moves.  In 1995, the BOT increased the mini-
mum cash reserve requirement for short-term loans from 2% to
7%.222  The following year, the BOT limited the BIBF banks’ foreign
denominated loans to 7% of their domestic currency loans and set
the ratio of one-to-one for “out-in” and “out-out” lending.223  In
March 1997, the BOT ordered various distressed finance companies
to raise their capital reserves to cover possible defaults.224  Unfortu-
nately, these measures were much too late to prevent the distribution
of billions of dollars to finance poor investments.
The increasing level of defaults, coupled with the declining value
of collateral, produced very lopsided balance sheets in the financial
sector.  Clearly, insufficient checks were in place to prevent the mis-
allocation of funds.  Lapses in the industry’s regulatory structure be-
came apparent in May 1996 when the scandal involving the Bangkok
Bank of Commerce (BBC) erupted.225  The BBC was a medium size
218. See id. at 38.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 34.
221. At least one estimate of offshore debt of Thai companies totals $75 billion.  See
Vatikiotis, supra note 167.
222. See Prystay, supra note 196.
223. See id. at 55.  Out-in lending means that foreign capital is brought into Thailand to fi-
nance projects while out-out lending entails foreign capital being deployed in other countries in
the region.
224. See Warner, supra note 210, at 71.  It was also stated that the Financial Institutions
Development Fund would provide more equity for financial companies unable to raise enough
capital by themselves.  See id.  This policy reinforced the belief that financial companies would
be bailed out.
225. See Bank of Thailand under Fire over $3bn Loans Scandal, THE BANKER, July 1996, at
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commercial bank that had over 50% ($3 billion) of its loans devoted
to questionable stock deals and fraudulent loans.226  While commenta-
tors have acknowledged that the BBC was an anomaly, the failure of
the BOT to intervene at an earlier date pointed to a weak supervi-
sory system.227  Even more troubling, the BOT refused to close down
the bank.  The Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF),
which is essentially a rescue fund for cash-starved financial institu-
tions managed by the BOT,228 instead took a 65% stake in the BBC.229
The FIDF had even proposed to buy most of the bad debts at a dis-
count of only about 20%.230
The BOT’s actions in the BBC scandal typify the agency’s early
handling of the banking crisis.  In September 1996, Thailand’s credit
rating was downgraded because of over-reliance by Thai banks on
“hot money” to fund their medium- and long-term loans.231  The
BOT’s response was to request that banks reduce their exposure to
short-term foreign debt and to maintain a tight money policy.232  In-
terest rates of 13%-14% helped restrain the lending of financial insti-
tutions and encouraged depositors not to withdraw their savings, but
it also made it difficult for cash-strapped companies to find afford-
able credit to continue operating.233
In February 1997, Somprasong Land became the first of three
large property firms to slip into insolvency, thereby earning the dubi-
ous distinction of being the first Thai company to default on its Euro-
convertible bond.234  Fearing the precipitation of other corporate fail-
ures, the BOT refused to devalue the baht, a measure that would
have increased the pressure on companies laden with dollar denomi-
nated loans.235  On the other hand, the BOT’s decision to defend the
pegged exchange rate necessitated a massive expenditure of its for-
eign reserves.  In February 1997, foreign reserves stood at a reassur-
77.
226. See id.
227. See Sender, supra note 211, at 51.
228. See Apisith John Sutham, The Asian Financial Crisis and the Deregulation and Liber-
alization of Thailand’s Financial Services Sector: Barbarians at the Gate, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.
J. 1890, 1899 (1998).
229. See Warner, supra note 210.
230. See id.  In January 1998, the BOT discounted the assets of the BBC by 95%.  See
Henny Sender, Money Isn’t Everything, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 12, 1998, at 59.
231. See Marriott, supra note 195, at 34.
232. See id.
233. See id
234. See Vitikiotis, supra note 167.
235. See Mertens & Prystay, supra note 192.
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ing 21% of GDP,236 but after a futile attempt to fend off speculators,
the foreign reserves shrank by almost one-half to an estimated $16-
$17 billion.237  By August 1997, foreign reserves dwindled to a mere
$800 million.238
The strategy of maintaining a pegged exchange rate drove up in-
terest rates and put further strain on the domestic economy as af-
fordable financing disappeared.239  Recognizing this problem, the Thai
government established a two-tiered exchange rate and implemented
capital controls to allow a slight lowering of interest rates in Thai-
land, while still driving up the costs for speculation.240  Eventually, the
BOT was forced to abandon this segmented approach because of
market pressures.241
The BOT had hung its hopes on mergers to stabilize the financial
sector.  On April 2, 1997, the BOT provided various incentives for fi-
nancial companies to merge.  For instance, a merged group meeting
certain net capital and asset requirements would be allowed to en-
gage in a wider range of banking services, including foreign exchange
and low rate savings deposits.242  The BOT also dangled before the in-
stitutions the possibility of receiving a banking license before any
merger group that met an even higher set of requirements.243  Such an
upgrade, however, would require the group to absorb weaker institu-
tions at the discretion of the BOT.244  Experts believed that, in addi-
tion to this proviso, an array of complex tax and legal rules would
discourage many companies from seeking a merger.245
On March 11, 1997, the government established the Property
Loan Management Organization (PLMO) to buy non-performing
loans that had partially developed real estate as collateral.246  Critics
opined that the fund would be largely ineffective because it was ex-
236. See Vitikiotis, supra note 167.
237. See Vitikiotis, supra note 204.
238. See Thanong Khanthong & Vatchara Charoonsantikul, Leading up to Tarrin’s Banking
Reform Package, NATION, Aug. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 15055821.
239. See Vitikiotis, supra note 204.
240. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Emerging Market Currency Crisis of July
1997, at 49, 49 (1997).
241. See id. (describing the events which led to the abandonment of capital controls).
242. See Warner, supra note 210.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Vitikiotis, supra note 175, at 71.
246. See Warner, supra note 210, at 71.
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tremely undercapitalized.247  The critics also argued that most banks
would be unlikely to avail themselves of this outlet because the
PLMO was believed to be willing to accept only the best non-
performing loans.248
On June 27, 1997, five days before the floating of the baht, the
government attempted to inspire more confidence in the financial
system by temporarily closing sixteen shaky financial institutions for
thirty days.249  The government gave the closed institutions two weeks
to submit plans for their re-organization to the Finance Ministry, and
encouraged the closed institutions to merge with healthier compa-
nies.250  After a prolonged stage of denial filled with numerous futile
initiatives, fifty-eight of the ninety-one finance companies were fi-
nally shut, but only after the BOT had already supplied them with a
cash infusion equivalent to about 10% of Thailand’s GDP.251
Also on June 27, 1997, the government enacted the so-called
“Royal Decrees.”252  These laws, among other things, relaxed restric-
tions on foreign ownership of commercial banks and encouraged
mergers of insolvent finance companies.253  Another set of reform
laws, known as the “Emergency Decrees,” became effective on Oc-
tober 25, 1997 and served to strengthen the supervisory powers of the
BOT.254  Among the more notable decrees, the Emergency Decree on
Financial Sector Restructuring B.E. 2540 laid down the legal frame-
work for creating the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority
(FRA).255  The FRA was charged with the supervision of the sus-
pended financial institutions.  The fifty-eight closed financial compa-
nies were required to submit their rehabilitation plans to the FRA,
which would then decide if the institution should be liquidated.256
The FRA would auction off those assets that it deemed to be beyond
rehabilitation.257
The Emergency Decree on the Asset Management Corporation
247. See Mertens & Prystay, supra note 192, at 15.
248. See id.
249. See Warner, supra note 210.
250. See id. at 71.
251. See Vitikiotis, supra note 204.
252. For a detailed description of the laws and regulations governing the Thai financial in-
dustry, see Sutham, supra note 228.
253. See id. at 1904-05.
254. See id. at 1907-08.
255. See id. at 1905.
256. See Warner, supra note 205, at 39.
257. See Sutham, supra note 228, at 1908.
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B.E. 2540 was also a significant development.258  This decree estab-
lished the Asset Management Corporation (AMC), which was in-
structed to bid on the assets of the financial companies in liquidation
and attempt to sell them.259  The AMC was authorized to establish its
own rules regarding the valuation of the assets and collateral that it
purchased.260
C. The Application of an American Solution to a Thai Problem
An inquiry into the causation of any social and economic phe-
nomenon obviously is not an exact science.  Nevertheless, it would be
relatively uncontroversial to posit that the magnitude of both the
American and the Thai banking disasters can be attributed to a com-
bination of supervisory lapses, misguided regulations, and severe
economic conditions.  From a systemic perspective, these factors cre-
ated conditions where individuals were given the capabilities and the
incentives to engage in high-risk investments in a distorted economic
environment.
In the United States, the regulatory quilt was entirely inappro-
priate during periods of high inflation and resulted in a severe inter-
est rate mismatch and heavy losses to the thrift industry.  The gov-
ernment’s subsequent deregulatory efforts261 enhanced the thrifts’
ability to attract capital while simultaneously expanding their invest-
ment authority.  Emboldened by minimum net worth exposure and
deposit insurance, savings institutions had both the opportunity and
the incentive to gamble with large amounts of other people’s
money.262  During the 1980s, the S&Ls plunged into unfamiliar and
risky investment vehicles, unrestrained by the moderating influence
of either economic prudence or adequate government supervision.263
In Thailand, a situation with similar dynamics developed.  A
pegged exchange rate policy,264 in the context of modern capital mar-
kets and deteriorating trade and economic conditions, made Thailand
extremely vulnerable to large shifts in international capital flows and
258. See id. at 1905.
259. See Warner, supra note 205, at 39.
260. See Sutham, supra note 228, at 1908.
261. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 88, 90.
262. See PAUL ZANE PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE S&L
MESS 125-26 (1989).
263. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 99.
264. See Paul M. Sherer, Thailand Shows IMF Intervention Doesn’t Necessarily Cure Basic
Ills, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1997, at A14.
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speculative currency attacks.  During more optimistic times, Thai
companies, especially real estate developers, borrowed enormous
amounts of unhedged foreign-denominated loans which were subsi-
dized in effect by the BOT’s monetary and exchange rate policies.265
Thai financial institutions, which were awash with foreign capital, had
imprudently underwritten scores of unsound business ventures.266  All
parties involved apparently operated with the unmitigated belief in
the Thai government’s commitment to maintain a fixed exchange
rate and bail out troubled financial institutions.
1. Basic Principles Drawn from the Resolution of the S&L
Crisis.  The legislative effort to resolve the thrift crisis in the United
States can be divided into two parts.  First, Congress tightened the
regulatory regime267 to stop the hemorrhaging of losses suffered by
thrift institutions.  Second, Congress established a mechanism to
dispose of the assets of insolvent thrifts.268
A key element in strengthening the supervisory powers of thrift
regulators was, ironically, the curtailment of their discretion.  By
raising accounting standards and mandating tougher inspections,269
Congress apparently hoped that a breach of the minimum capital re-
quirements would immediately compel regulators to take corrective
actions against the offending institution.  In order to effectuate these
regulations, however, it was necessary that the policy of forbearance
be consciously discarded.
For those thrifts failing to meet their net worth requirements,
the RTC proved to be an effective government device for the effi-
cient disposal of the insolvent thrifts’ assets.270  While the RTC was
sufficiently capitalized, an important contributing factor to its success
was its pervasive deal-making ethos.271  The flexibility and the expedi-
tion with which the RTC carried out its mission enabled the govern-
ment to recoup a significant portion of its claims.  Furthermore, its
willingness to tap the expertise of Wall Street’s talent272 allowed the
265. See John Greenwood, The Lessons of Asia’s Currency Crisis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1997,
at A22.
266. See id.
267. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 128-31.
268. See id. at 135-40.
269. See id. at 129-30.
270. See Martin Mayer, Turnaround at the RTC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1992, at A10.
271. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Property Holders Find Sealed-Bid Sale An Effective Method for
Moving Assets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1992, at A2.
272. See KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL 277 (1993).
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RTC to put together innovative deals that would attract investors
without giving away too much.
2. Obstacles to Implementing the American Approach in
Thailand.  In 1997, the BOT sought to stem the government’s losses
by closing a number of failed financial institutions.  Such actions,
however, are only the beginning of the process of financial recovery.
Other steps are necessary to bring the financial system back on
sounder footing and to prevent the recurrence of widespread
institutional failures.
One of the major criticisms of the Thai banking system is not
necessarily that banks are too big to fail, but that banks are too po-
litical to fail.273  The BOT and the Ministry of Finance are given ex-
tremely wide discretion in the regulation of financial institutions un-
der the Commercial Banking Act (CBA) and the Act on the
Undertaking of Finance Business, Securities Business, and Credit
Foncier Business B.E. 2522 (1979)(FSCA), i.e., the principal laws
governing the banks and finance companies, respectively.274  Regula-
tors may be inclined to forebear not only because of misplaced opti-
mism and self-denial, as was the case in the U.S., but also because of
political favoritism.  As one economist observed, “[t]oo many people
had a vested interest in the system.  A lot of people became rich
when capital controls were relaxed, and they could access funds with
low interest rates.  They didn’t want to see the system change.”275
The problem of regulatory discretion begins at the licensing
stage.  As a prerequisite, banks must receive a license from the Minis-
try of Finance, and this license is contingent upon the recommenda-
tion of the Bank of Thailand.276  The decision whether to grant a li-
cense rests upon vague and subjective criteria, such as the applicant’s
“reputation, history, contribution to the Thai economy, and intent to
develop the international banking system in Thailand.”277  Conse-
quently, participation in the banking system is very restricted and
competition is limited.  The four largest banks in Thailand held
roughly 70% of all bank assets.278  Those banks, the Bangkok Bank,
273. See Sender, supra note 211, at 53.
274. See Sutham, supra note 228, at 1890-91.
275. Sender, supra note 211, at 52 (quoting an anonymous economist).
276. See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171, at 7.
277. Id.
278. See Peter Janssen, Banking and Finance - Banks Underpin Economic Success (visited
October 16, 1998) <http://web3.asia1.com.sg/timesnet/data/ab/docs/ab1021.html>.
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the Thai Farmers Bank, the Krung Thai Bank, and the Siam Com-
mercial Bank, are controlled respectively by the powerful Sophon-
panich and Lamsam families, the government, and the monarchy.279
Further, the Thai Military Bank, which is also one of the larger
banks, is run by the armed forces.280
The discretion of the regulatory agencies continues in the super-
vision of the banks.  The CBA authorizes regulators to take correc-
tive measures that may entail the revocation of licenses, closure of
branch offices, or placement of institutions under receivership.281  It
also authorizes the Ministry of Finance and the BOT to establish
various rules and regulations regarding, among other operational
matters, the interest rate payable on deposits, capitalization stan-
dards, and minimum cash reserves.282  For instance, they require do-
mestic commercial banks to hold minimum capital reserves equal to
8% of their assets and contingent liabilities.283  Also, commercial
banks may not lend more than 25% of their capital to any one per-
son.284
In exercising its authority, the BOT has established a number of
mandatory ratios and other requirements that constrain the manner
in which financial institutions can operate.285  The restrictions relate
to such matters as liquidity, capital adequacy, and investment deci-
sions.  On the whole, these regulations seem to provide a reasonable
framework for supervising financial institutions, and in certain re-
spects, Thailand’s regulatory regime is quite progressive.  For exam-
ple, the BOT imposed risk-based capital standards.  Thus, assets that
are relatively more risky require an institution to hold correspond-
ingly more capital reserves.286  In addition, the BOT has required
banks to classify their loans according to their quality and has re-
cently commanded banks to set aside reserves equal to a specified
percentage of the loan, depending on its collection grade.  These two
aspects of the regulatory regime suggest, in principal, that there is a
279. See id.  Technically, an individual may own a maximum of 5% of a bank’s shares with
certain exceptions.  This limit, however, is subject to modification at the discretion of the BOT
which may also attach conditions if it so chooses.  See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171, at 5.
280. See Janssen, supra note 278.
281. See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171, at 7.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 14.
284. See id. at 15.
285. For a discussion of the BOT’s regulations concerning finance companies and banks, 
see Sutham, supra note 228, at 1895-1920.
286. See id. at 1900, 1915.
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correlation between the business decisions of managers and the level
of strictures imposed upon the institution.  The BOT, nevertheless,
still maintains broad discretion over financial institutions and may ul-
timately choose not to take decisive action.
As part of their compliance efforts, banks must submit yearly
audited financial statements and balance sheets as well as monthly
reports of assets and liabilities to the Ministry of Finance and the
BOT.287  The usefulness of these reports, however, is qualified since
there is no specification of auditing standards other than the disal-
lowance of auditors who are not approved by the BOT or who are
otherwise employed by the bank.288  Furthermore, the accounting
standards are far from rigorous.  A collateralized loan was previously
not categorized as non-performing until twelve months had passed
without payment.289  Although the BOT has shortened the accrual pe-
riod for payments in arrears by six months, far more drastic regula-
tory reforms are needed.290
Ideally, regulations should minimize market distortions so that
the financial interests of the managers and directors of banks are
identified with those of the institution itself.  The automatic closure
of financial institutions once their capital reserves fall below a pre-
scribed positive level would constrain the discretionary authority of
regulators and impose some measure of market discipline.  Other less
draconian sanctions could be triggered at different levels of sub-par
performance.  To further the accountability of managers for their in-
vestment decisions, criminal and civil sanctions could be stiffened.
Also, accounting and reporting guidelines could be designed so that
regulating agencies receive accurate, timely information and so that
the market can assess the relative health of different financial institu-
tions.291
In many respects, the resolution of the Thai banking problems
poses a greater challenge than that of the S&L crisis.  While many of
the thrifts’ assets were of dubious quality, they could be packaged
with “good” assets to offer an attractive investment opportunity.  In
287. See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171, at 12.
288. See id.
289. See Warner, supra note 205.
290. See id.
291. In the wake of the S&L crisis, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which implemented a weakened version of these
proposals.  See George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16
CATO J. 1996 at 17, 29-31 (outlining similar proposals in his description of a structured, early
intervention and resolution program).
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Thailand, most of the assets controlled by financial institutions con-
sist of property that had served as collateral.  Because the property
market will be saturated for many years to come, even fire sale prices
will not entice many investors.  Furthermore, due to the absence of a
well-developed securities market, financial intermediation plays a
much more integral role in the Thai economy than in the United
States.  Closing the taps on bank lending, therefore, would dry up
capital liquidity and bring growth in Thailand to a standstill.  Thus,
the Thai government must perform a precarious balancing act in the
reformation of its financial sector.  Political dawdling will likely com-
pound the losses and merely postpone inevitable changes.  Cleaning
up the banking system will require a decisive, yet innovative ap-
proach.
In reality, any drastic reform efforts that might endanger en-
trenched privileges would likely provoke vehement opposition from
vested interest groups.  The business elite, the government bureauc-
racy, and the military are likely to have a major input into important
policy changes.  On the other hand, Thailand has a multi-party par-
liamentary democracy which has experienced numerous changes in
government.292  The parliament, and consequently the cabinet, are
characterized by coalition governments, since no single party can
garner a majority of the seats.293  Powerful, and oftentimes lucrative,
ministerial posts have become political bargaining chips instead of
vehicles for committed policy implementation.294  These attributes of
Thailand’s democratic government can act equally as a catalyst or a
hindrance to change.
Even assuming that meaningful reform measures can be promul-
gated, it is uncertain whether the infrastructure necessary for effec-
tive enforcement is in place.  For example, more regulators would
need training to learn how to assess the risks of various investment
instruments and to detect fraudulent or inaccurate accounting prac-
tices.  Auditors should also receive certification or licenses to insure a
minimum standard of professionalism.  In addition, criminal and civil
sanctions may have to be revamped in order to provide a signifcant
deterrent for inappropriate self-dealing behavior.
A related issue is whether these necessary reforms should be un-
dertaken gradually or immediately.  Compared to the United States,
292. See COUDERT BROTHERS ET AL., THAILAND LAW YEARBOOK 1995, at 11.
293. See id. at 13.
294. See id.
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Thailand still has an undeveloped and shallow economy, which is
largely export-driven.  Consequently, Thailand’s government must
balance the need for regulatory reform with the need for maintaining
liquidity to encourage economic growth and development.  While
these two interests are not mutually exclusive, the pace and ordering
of reform is open to debate.295
The introduction of large-scale changes increases the likelihood
of instability.  This is particularly true in the context of Thailand’s
banking system, which consists of only fifteen domestic banks296 and
has outstanding credit exceeding Thailand’s annual GDP.297 Given
the dominant role of only a few banks in the Thai economy, an in-
flexible “closure rule” could create substantial financial and social
dislocations.298  In order for market forces to function properly, re-
strictions on competition in the financial industry will first have to be
loosened.  The licensing procedure, in other words, should be more
open and less dependent on arbitrary bureaucratic decisions.  Con-
versely, more competition might create incentives for banks to un-
derwrite riskier ventures, thus undermining the stability of the sys-
tem.  At any rate, crises provide a window of opportunity to push
through needed changes, despite opposition by vested interest
groups.
In order to employ techniques similar to those used by the RTC,
the infrastructure must be in place.  One method that holds out the
promise of both the monetization of assets and the matching of asset
and liability maturities is securitization.  Prior to the currency crash
in Asia, the asset-backed securitization market was beginning to take
root.299  Both Thailand and Indonesia were expected to be the first
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries to board
295. Reforming a banking system entails much more than simply the adoption of various
policies or statutes.  A great deal of infrastructure is necessary to ensure that the system oper-
ates effectively as a whole.  In general, academics have debated the proper sequence of reforms
which would be in the long-term development interests of less-developed countries.  See gener-
ally SEQUENCING?: FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 164.
296. See Janssen, supra note 278.
297. See Sender, supra note 211, at 53.  For comparison, one of America’s largest banks,
Chase Manhattan, controls assets whose value equals about 4% of the United States’ GDP,
whereas Thailand’s largest bank, Bangkok Bank, controls assets equivalent to 25% of Thai-
land’s GDP.  See Sender, supra note 211 at 58.
298. This potential problem is rendered somewhat less dire by the fact that there are a
number of other institutions that provide bank-like services, such as finance and credit foncier
companies.  See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171.
299. See Marks Nicholls & Sumit Paul-Choudhury, Security Conscious, ASIA RISK, Feb.
1998, at 24.
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the securitization bandwagon because of their relatively favorable le-
gal and economic environments.300  A number of large transactions
have already been put together in Thailand by a variety of issuers,
but mostly by leasing companies.301  In 1995, TelecomAsia was the
originator for a $120 million deal involving receivables from
AT&T.302  In August 1996, ING Barings structured a deal for Tru-
Way and Tisco Leasing that securitized $250 million of car hire pur-
chases.303  On May 14, 1997, Sitca Investment and Securities, a finance
company, securitized $83 million of car hire purchases in a deal which
required the BOT’s approval.304
One of the June 24, 1997 Emergency Decrees was intended to
expedite the securitization process.305  Commercial banks, as well as
finance, credit foncier, and securities companies, were the targeted
beneficiaries of this speedier approval process.306  Despite this at-
tempt to stimulate the use of securitization by financial institutions,
several obstacles must be overcome.  Because Thailand lacks the le-
gal concept of the trust,307 securitization transactions instead employ
the special purpose vehicle, which, like any other company, must pay
taxes.308  While many deals are structured offshore to reduce taxes,
the securitization of mortgages would involve a transfer of assets
which were previously subject to a 7% value added tax (VAT) and a
1% land transfer tax.309  As a consequence, securitization was eco-
nomically infeasible in many cases to liquidate the assets or to im-
prove the balance sheets of financial institutions.  In response to the
deepening crisis, however, securitization transactions have since been
exempted from specialized business taxes, VAT, and the stamp
duty.310
In addition, many investors may demand a hefty yield because of
the uncertain economic environment.  Although insurance guaran-
300. See Cherie Marriott, On the Rebound in Asia, GLOBAL FIN., Oct. 1996, at 45, 46.
301. See Brian Mertens, Securitisation Emerging in SE Asia, ASIAN BUS., June 1997, at 12.
302. See Marriott, supra note 300, at 45.
303. See Mertens, supra note 301, at 13.
304. See id. at 12.
305. See Office of the Securities and Commission Exchange, Press Release No. 59 (visited
October 16, 1998) <http://www.sec.or.th/press/59.html>.
306. See id.
307. See Pornvalai & Perry, supra note 171, at 4.
308. See Mertens, supra note 301, at 13.
309. See id.
310. See Govt Approves Measures to Promote SPVs, BUS. DAY (Thail.), July 22, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7907756.
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tees can back or “wrap” securities to give the securities a higher rat-
ing,311 such monoline insurance will certainly be expensive.  The un-
predictability of exchange rates also presents a disincentive for inves-
tors.  To lessen the risks posed by currency fluctuations, transactions
can incorporate currency swaps.  The market for such swaps, how-
ever, may still be recuperating from the recent currency turmoil.312  In
summary, these market conditions drive up the costs of raising capi-
tal, rendering even fewer securitization transactions cost-effective.
3. August 1998 Reform Measures.  On August 14, 1998, the
Thai government unveiled an ambitious reform plan, which it
particularized in three emergency decrees.313  The centerpiece of the
plan was a 300 billion baht (about $7.5 billion) recapitalization of the
finance industry, designed to jump-start the economy by increasing
liquidity.314 The decrees set up two credit support facilities as
mechanisms to deploy the recapitalization funds.315  Among other
things, the decrees also closed down four banks and five finance
companies that were unable to raise sufficient new capital.316
The Tier 1 credit facility was intended to salvage the good assets
of institutions.  Banks and financing companies intending to use this
facility are required to adopt certain loan classification and provi-
sioning standards that were originally to become effective at the end
of 2000.317  This requirement reduces the uncertainty of bad loans and
forces the original shareholders to absorb any losses resulting from a
write-down,318 thus facilitating the recapitalization process.319 Fur-
thermore, capital raised subsequently from either private or public
sources will receive preferred status over the claims of the existing
shareholders.  Lastly, if the capital adequacy ratio of a participating
institution falls below 2.5%, the government agrees to top up the in-
stitution’s capital reserves with tradable government bonds.320
311. See Marriott, supra note 300, at 45.
312. See Nicholls & Paul-Choudhury, supra note 299, at 26.
313. See Banks to Get Bt300-bn Injection, NATION, Aug. 15, 1998, at 1.
314. See id.
315. See Banking Sector Reforms, NATION, Aug. 15, 1998, at 2 (reproducing the emergency
decrees).
316. See Banks to Get Bt300-bn Injection, supra note 313.
317. See Banking Sector Reforms, supra note 315.
318. A write-down involves a bank either “reducing the par value of its shares, or the num-
ber of its shares to reflect a fall in the value of its assets.”  Banks Pose a Thorny Political Puzzle
for Government, BUS. DAY (Thail.), Aug. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 17480180.
319. See id.
320. See id.
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The Tier 2 credit facility encourages the financial institutions to
work with their corporate customers to restructure debt.  Subject to
certain restrictions, a financial institution concluding a legally binding
debt restructuring agreement would be eligible to receive capital in-
jections equal to the amount of “write-offs, net of amounts provi-
sioned, as well as 20 per cent of the net increase in outstanding loans
to the private sector.”321
Before the government announced the plan, there was specula-
tion that Thailand would adopt the Chilean banking reform model.322
In Chile, the government nationalized the banks’ non-performing
loans, which were then replaced with a ten-year government bond.323
Although the banks were obligated to buy back their bad assets at a
later date, they were able to resume normal lending practices almost
immediately.324  In Thailand’s case, the bad assets would have been
transferred to the AMC.  The Finance Minister rejected this model
on the grounds that it would have introduced too many complicated
issues such as the valuation method of bad assets, the source of
funding for the AMC, and the proper accounting method for the
banks’ books.325  Consequently, the Thai reform plan left the non-
performing loans in the hands of the financial institutions and set up
the recapitalization method described above.
The initial response of the public and the private sector to the re-
form measures has been encouraging.326  The existing shareholders
will have to absorb a huge portion of their equity in order to take
part in the plan, which lessens the perception that the rich are being
bailed out at the public’s expense.  Nonetheless, some allegations are
beginning to swirl that the plan is being implemented on a discrimi-
natory basis, since some banks were allowed further time to recapi-
talize.327  At any rate, experts predict that Thailand will require an
additional $10 billion in foreign capital to complete the bail-out.328
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Govt Looks at Chilean Bail-Outs, NATION, Aug. 7, 1998, available in 1998
WL 15055574.
323. See Bank Bail-Out Plan Hostage to Many Factors, NATION, Aug. 17, 1998, available in
1998 WL 15055824.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See X File, The Economy as a Jigsaw: Piecing Together the Puzzle, BANGKOK POST,
Aug. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 17206458.
327. See Banking Reform Measures Get Mixed Reactions, BUS. DAY (Thail.), Aug. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7908006.
328. See Declining Interest Rates Will Prompt Recovery, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 18, 1998,
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V.  CONCLUSION
The financial woes of the S&L and Thai economic crises share a
similar matrix of perverse incentives and conditions from which their
financial woes had arisen.  Despite all the differences between the
two countries, America’s resolution of its problems provides a num-
ber of guiding principles and a useful starting point for discussing
possible reforms of Thailand’s financial system.  Although Thai
regulators should certainly have limited discretion to allow hopelessly
defunct financial institutions to remain open, an automatic closure
rule would have caused enormous disruptions in Thailand’s economy.
The Thai economy, unlike that of the United States, is in a fragile de-
velopmental stage and still relies heavily on disintermediation fi-
nancing from relatively few institutions.  Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of timely and accurate accounting remains equally forceful in
both cases.
It remains to be seen whether the FRA/AMC will evolve into an
entity similar to the RTC, with the authority and the capability to
clean up Thailand’s financial sector.  Given the deteriorated state of
the industry’s assets, any such entity could greatly benefit from an
examination of the American model.  The RTC quickly disposed of
distressed assets and realized very high returns by employing various
innovative techniques such as auctions and securitization.  Crucial to
the RTC’s success was its willingness to tap the expertise of big finan-
cial players and its pervasive deal-making attitude, which allowed the
flexibility to package deals that would attract investors without giving
too much away in the process.  In Thailand, however, there are still a
number of issues that would have to be addressed, such as where the
funding for the AMC would come from and whether adequate infra-
structure would be available.  Moreover, it is questionable whether
the Thai government would welcome a large portion of its economy
to fall in the hands of foreign investors.
Alvin K. Lim
available in 1998 WL 17206332.
